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Although cognitive science was multidisciplinary from the start, an under-emphasis on
anthropology has left the field with limited research in small scale, indigenous societies.
Neglecting the anthropological perspective is risky, given that once-canonical cognitive
science findings have often been shown to be artifacts of enculturation rather than
cognitive universals. This imbalance has become more problematic as the increased
use of Western theory-driven approaches, many of which assume human uniformity
(“universality”), confronts the absence of a robust descriptive base that might provide
clarifying or even contrary evidence. We highlight the need for remedies to such
shortcomings by suggesting a two-fold methodological shift. First, studies conducted
in indigenous societies can benefit by relying on multidisciplinary research groups to
diminish ethnocentrism and enhance the quality of the data. Second, studies devised
for Western societies can readily be adapted to the changing settings encountered
in the field. Here, we provide examples, drawn from the areas of emotion and facial
expressions, to illustrate potential solutions to recurrent problems in enhancing the
quality of data collection, hypothesis testing, and the interpretation of results.
Keywords: multidisciplinary approach, indigenous societies, methods, facial expressions, emotion, culture
INTRODUCTION
Translating knowledge from one scientific domain to another is always constrained by differences
in methods, description, goals, and explanation. Researchers who wish to establish facts about
human cognition are also plagued by problems in translation, but they may not realize it. The
translation problems are partly due to the fact that people differ cognitively from culture to culture.
How and how much is uncertain, but much cognitive science research proceeds as if this difference
did not matter.
Cognitive science’s foundational goal of multidisciplinary collaboration among disciplines
has gradually receded. Nowadays, psychologists produce the majority of the publications, are
overrepresented in cognitive science’s conferences, and psychological findings are especially
compelling to the media and funding agencies (Gentner, 2010). Psychology’s dominant status
within cognitive science has also set the research agenda in the search for shared mechanisms that
produce behavior and general laws that predict and govern it. The former approach collided with
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anthropologists’ findings on diversity across human populations
(Shweder, 2012). Moreover, psychologists and anthropologists’
research goals and methods previously seen as complementary
now seem incompatible (Bender et al., 2010; Beller et al., 2012).
Our own field, that of emotion and facial expression, is a
sprawling area rich in controversies. All in all, the predominance
of experimental psychologists searching for general laws, the
tradition of conceptualizing emotions as natural entities with
casual properties, the use of canonical operationalizations (e.g.,
theory-driven facial expression matching-to-sample studies), and
the generation of emotion theories based on US American
samples as the normative population, have left no room for
multidisciplinary collaborations with anthropologists (Russell,
1991; Wierzbicka, 2014; Plamper, 2015).
In this paper, we discuss the benefits for an effective
integration of anthropology within cognitive science. Using
examples from our own research on emotion and facial
expression, we highlight challenges that researchers are likely
to encounter when they attempt to conduct studies in small-
scale, indigenous societies. By considering these issues, we have
begun to resolve key questions only because we have relied on
the combined strengths of a multidisciplinary research team
established by psychologists and anthropologists carrying out
their research beyond the necessarily artificial Western laboratory
setting.
WHY IS ANTHROPOLOGY SO
IMPORTANT FOR COGNITIVE SCIENCE?
Although it is now more accepted that obtaining human cognitive
science data from diverse societies enriches the data and any
conclusions drawn from them, the anthropological perspective
suggests that, even within any one society, the quality of human
cognitive science data can be improved. The main shortcomings
identified by a more anthropological perspective are: the use
of narrow samples, the inattention to diachronic features of
behavior, and inadvertent ethnocentric bias.
Narrow Sampling
A central issue concerns claims that are often made about
uniformity (“universality”) versus diversity in human behavior.
How confident can we be regarding these claims? In evaluating
any of them, we must remember that sampling from the human
population has been largely restricted to Western, educated,
and industrialized societies, and mainly college students at
that (Arnett, 2008; Henrich et al., 2010)1. But the solution to
narrow sampling should not be simply to dispatch groups of
psychologists to all possible field sites in order to study as many
“non-normative” societies as possible. Rather, narrow sampling
can be overcome by collaborating with researchers from other
disciplines (e.g., anthropologists but also linguists, sociologists or
1The category “Western” as we use it is admittedly a convenient fiction that
considers the “West” to be uniform and unified. It is often taken to mean those
societies that are roughly democratic, capitalistic, and permeated by American
and/or European media.
human geographers) with extensive knowledge in the field (Astuti
and Bloch, 2010; Majid and Levinson, 2010).
Anthropologists’ training leads them to gravitate toward
studying “non-standard populations.” In these less-studied
societies, anthropological accounts, among other sources, are
used to provide behavioral descriptions, representations of
the world, and indigenous frames of reference. Knowledge is
conceived not as a fixed, timeless corpus of accumulated facts,
but as relational, extensive and dynamic, and as such it is always
provisional and amenable to updating, re-tests and replications.
Diachronic Features of Behavior
In anthropology, assaying the spatial dispersion of a human
phenomenon (i.e., studying as many diverse indigenous societies
as possible) is only half the job. It is also essential to
study a phenomenon’s temporal dimensions—its diachronic
properties. Changes over time are extremely relevant for avoiding
misinterpretations of present behavioral patterns and their
functional accounts. The temporal dimension is often given
short shrift in psychological approaches, possibly because of
psychology’s long history of behavioral explanation via static trait
ascriptions in theories of personality. This can lead to a tendency
to view cultural constructs as timeless and fixed, instead of as
dynamical systems (Schmittmann et al., 2013).
Considering culture dynamically implies that cognitive
scientists will often need to consider returning to the field
periodically in order to update their cultural databases regularly.
Accordingly, advances in techniques such as network analysis
or text analysis can be employed for mapping within-culture
diachronic changes rigorously and quantitatively (Borgatti
et al., 2009; Iliev and Ojalehto, 2015). For example, a recent
debate between a group of psychologists studying “emotional”
vocalizations among the pastoralists Himba of Namibia and
an anthropologist with extensive experience in the same
society is illustrative of two different attitudes toward reporting
and describing the members of an indigenous society. The
psychologists depicted Himba participants as people isolated
from other cultural groups (Sauter et al., 2010). In their eagerness
to describe their participants as visually “isolated” from other
cultural groups living in settlements geographically distant from
urban centers, the psychologists did not report that the Himba
they sampled had been in contact with other cultural groups since
the 1860s (Gewald, 2010). Therefore, the anthropologist’s main
criticism was aimed at psychologists’ deficient descriptions and
how they overlooked relevant diachronic information.
Ethnocentrism
The concept of ethnocentrism refers to a bias toward one’s
in-group (Gumplowicz, 1879; Sumner, 1906). Accordingly,
Western researchers going to the field must realize that
the Western cultural frame of reference shapes the way we
categorize reality, build our theories, test our hypotheses,
and make universal assumptions based on “canonical” English
descriptors (Wierzbicka, 2014). To overcome this problem,
anthropologists are warned of these risks beforehand. Even well-
trained researchers can unknowingly be trapped by their cultural
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backgrounds, which leads to biased descriptions and explanations
of events (DeVita, 1990).
The anthropological method works to limit ethnocentrism
by having investigators (i) remain in the field for a sufficient
period of time, (ii) understand and speak the vernacular, (iii)
conduct participant observation, (iv) discern what are termed
the “rich points” within the culture (i.e., those events that we
find unexplainable or collide with our beliefs and previous
theories), and (v) pursue answers to the research questions
posed by such rich points (Agar, 1986, 1996). Consequently, the
investigator’s stance during the first stages of fieldwork is agnostic
and exploratory.
Subtle forms of ethnocentrism may persist nonetheless,
especially when doing fieldwork in indigenous societies. One
striking example is the Western conception of the distinction
between when we are in private (i.e., in solitude) vs. in public
(i.e., in the presence of others). Posed as a dichotomy, this
distinction was used by emotion researchers to divide facial
behaviors into two classes: those produced alone were genuine
“emotional expressions,” whereas those produced in the presence
of others were “social” expressions that were subject to faking
or masking (Ekman and Friesen, 1969; Ekman, 2003). For
anthropologists, the public vs. private dichotomy can be arbitrary
and unproductive (see, for example, Good and Chanoff, 1991).
Moreover, the conception of the private, inner self, rarely if ever
revealed in public, seems to be distinctly Western, with some
historians tracing it to St. Augustine (Cary, 2000).
Indeed, the situations in which a Trobriand Islander is
completely alone are rare, and they are mainly associated with
the practice of some types of magic (megwa)2. In these situations,
magic practitioners confine themselves at night in the bush or
in solitary cliffs, but they are far from alone. Magic spells differ,
but most have in common the recalling of deceased matriclan
ancestors to help them in their magic (Jarillo de la Torre, 2013;
Mosko, 2014). Thus when these sorcerers are physically alone,
psychologically speaking, there is always an implicit audience to
whom they speak and with whom they interact (Fridlund, 1991,
1994).
The Problem of Description
In the 18th century, slow but systematic work by taxonomists
created solid ground for generating theories in biology. In the
same vein, early animal behaviorists stressed the importance
of pre-theoretical description, and advocated segmenting
complex behavior sequences into smaller units for labeling
and classification (Hinde, 1970). There may be subjectivity in
how any stream of behavior is parsed, but such efforts have an
objective content and application (Blurton-Jones and Woodson,
1979). Anthropologists’ training is a special strength to the field
due to its focus on context as well as the use of robust descriptive
strategies. Moreover, native anthropologists are able to grasp
significant information from observing a given context, making
2The term megwa indicates the esoteric corpus of magic spells and practices that
Trobrianders use in their daily lives to assist them with gardening, fishing, sailing,
or courting. Megwa is a Kilivila word; Kilivila or biga Boyowa (“the word of
Boyowa,” Boyowa being the local name for Kiriwina Island) is the vernacular. It
belongs to the Austronesian family, Papuan tip cluster (Senft, 1986).
accurate inferences based on objects, body decorations, or even
the ecological environment (Young, 1998; Senft and Basso, 2009;
Medin and Bang, 2014).
In the field of emotion, the research agenda has largely been
one of theory validation over empirical approaches (Kagan,
2007). Accordingly, psychologists have relied for description
mostly on their own individual and cultural frames of reference,
assuming that those frames were normative and not culturally
constrained. In fact, Rai and Fiske (2010, p. 107) stated that,
“psychological theory over the past 40 years has been formulated
mostly on the basis of prior theory, data, and intuitions.”
Neglecting bottom–up strategies has led researchers to build
theories on problematic assumptions (Fernández-Dols, 2006),
especially when applicable and robust bottom–up methods have
been well-honed in other disciplines (Jack et al., 2012). We
next illustrate how Western preconceptions may have hampered
efforts at accurate description and explanation.
RETHINKING CROSS-CULTURAL
COMPARISONS
One prominent and pervasive uniformitarian cross-cultural
approach assumes that basic underlying psychological processes
are universal, whereas culture just taints with minimal variation
the uniform products of those universal processes in the resulting
phenotype (Berry et al., 2002). When applied to emotion research,
this uniformitarian approach tests hypotheses originated by
Western theories within a given cultural tradition (e.g., romantic
love). Usually, the studies are conducted in a Western-style
laboratory, the participants are Westernized, educated, middle-
class college students (who watch U.S. and European TV, listen
to American music, and whose course readings are often just
translated U.S. texts), and the data are leveraged to verify or falsify
Western-centric hypotheses on cultural differences.
Before going to the field, researchers following the
uniformitarian approach typically discuss and establish the
study design—a replication of the Western-society study.
In some cases, researchers do not go to the field, but use
collaborators who follow instructions pre-established in the
Western laboratory (Ekman, 1972, p. 281; Tracy and Robins,
2008, p. 520). Once in the field, the instructions are translated
to the local languages. Translations may be most vulnerable to
Western bias, given that direct translations are sometimes not
found. Inexact substitutes must be arranged on the spot, and even
with fairly exact translations, unappreciated nuances and idioms
in both source and destination vernaculars can compromise
the validity of the forward translation of the tasks and the back
translations of the responses. Researchers frequently rely on local
translators (Ekman, 1972; Sorenson, 1976; Sauter et al., 2010;
Gendron et al., 2014a,b); they may be differentially skilled at
forward and backward translation. At the end of the process, the
data gathered in the field are used as a comparison group for the
Western “normative” data.
Older views of cognition, which considered the contents of
thought to be local and culture-bound, whereas the modes of
cognitive processing were universal and culture-free, are now
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considered untenable (Park and Huang, 2010; Kitayama and
Uskul, 2011; Beller and Bender, 2015; Bender and Beller, 2016).
Culture affects both cognitive content and processes, a fact that
makes a reified view of “culture,” used as a mere nominal variable
in prior uniformitarian approaches, woefully inadequate to the
task of presenting how pervasively culture affects how people
differ in the ways they experience, discriminate, and categorize
their worlds (Beller et al., 2014; Ojalehto and Medin, 2015).
Historically, the content-process distinction prompted the
isolation of anthropologists from psychologists’ research agendas.
Whereas psychologists were focused on cognitive processes
under the assumption that they were universal at individual
and cultural levels (Bender et al., 2010; Beller et al., 2012),
anthropological findings were footnoted as minor variants or
demoted to the status of anecdotal evidence (e.g., Ekman, 1980).
Re-establishing collaborations with anthropologists is wholly
justified by the amount of evidence they have gathered on content
variation, the generation of hypothesis and the enhancement of
external validity, their expertise on overcoming the challenges
of the home-field disadvantage, and, specially, the importance
of integrating different but complementary methodological
approaches within cognitive science (Medin et al., 2010; Bender
and Beller, 2011; Bender et al., 2012; Kitayama, 2012)3.
THE INTEGRATION OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND
ANTHROPOLOGICAL METHODS
We propose the use of mixed methods research as a way to take
advantage of dual expertise: that of psychologists in quantitative
techniques, and social anthropologists in qualitative methods
(Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2010; Creswell, 2014). This integration
occurs in the field, where the anthropologist and the psychologist
guide each other and produce a true cross-disciplinary
collaboration between two different research traditions (Agar,
2013). Next, we will discuss the implications for future research
when integrating psychological and anthropological methods in
the field. We will focus on the exploratory, testing, and control
phases.
The Exploratory Phase
In the exploratory phase, data are obtained initially by qualitative
methods in order to aid the development of research instruments,
which then lead to the design and testing of hypotheses using
quantitative methods (Greene et al., 1989). This is in stark
contrast to previous universalist approaches, in which researchers
are dispatched to diverse cultures with measures already in hand,
3A thorough discussion of the “incommensurability of cultures” is beyond the
scope of this paper, and we disagree with such positions in extremis. Nonetheless,
we argue here that psychologists who go to the field with their theories in tow
often compare the behavior of members of diverse societies while overlooking
or oversimplifying critical contextual features that vitiate their comparisons. We
further contend that the anthropological perspective can be extremely valuable
for finding the “common ground” that allows cultural comparison without
undermining description and context. Our approach, then, stresses the distillation
of what is common ground by back-and-forth interplay rather than theoretical
presumption.
a strategy that is highly prone to the pitfall of “beating down” the
phenomenon to fit the study.
Indeed, the initial exploratory period we consider mandatory
may be especially revealing, in several ways. First, previous results
reported for that society may prove to be dated, or else to have
been misinterpretations or misunderstandings due to incomplete
knowledge of the cultural context, or no longer indicative of
current practices in the culture, and these findings may require
update, correction, or recontextualization. Second, more complex
designs may emerge which mandate further qualitative data (e.g.,
interviews), or the use of multiple methods in a convergent design
after the exploratory phase (Creswell et al., 2003). For example,
investigators may travel to diverse societies hoping to study the
emotional lives of their members, Likert scales in hand, only to
find that these members may find it off-putting to be asked openly
about their “feelings” and emotions.
Thus, the exploratory phase—taking place before the study
design and data collection—is crucial for enhancing the
validity of the study, the quality of the data, and the
robustness of interpretation. Qualitative anthropological research
demands “long-term and open-ended commitment, generous
attentiveness, relational depth and sensitivity to context” (Ingold,
2014, p. 384)4. To achieve these, participant observation, speaking
the vernacular, and building rapport are the three facets in the
exploratory phase that need to be accomplished in order to
proceed to the design and testing phase. We survey each of these
components.
Participant Observation
The best way to learn what is implicit and explicit in
another culture is through participant observation. Participant
observation can best be defined as the active process by which
the researcher strives to understand the socio-cultural universe of
the host community while participating in the enactment of that
universe. In that sense, the first step is to engage in the indigenous
society’s daily activities and to live by the standards of the host
community. Participant observation is a long-term investment.
The more time and resources investigators expend doing
participant observation, the better the quality and interpretation
of data they will obtain (Dewalt et al., 1998). Anthropologists
have discussed the extent to which emotional involvement and
degree of participation can and should determine the outcomes
(Clifford and Marcus, 1986). Indeed, moderate participation (e.g.,
rarely interacting in daily life, not living with an adopted family)
provides poor insights when compared with active and complete
participation (Spradley, 1980).
Active participant observation yields many benefits. First,
constant presence in daily events and regular interaction with
locals offers an explicit gesture of commitment toward local social
obligations, diminishing the hosts’ reluctance to communicate
explicit knowledge and enhancing the researcher’s implicit
knowledge of the indigenous society’s culture. Second, the
researcher gains access to all sorts of natural behaviors in a
4We subscribe to Ingold’s (2014, p. 390) affirmation that the method of the
anthropological discipline “lies in the observational engagement and perceptual
attunement that allow the practitioner to follow what is going on, and in turn to
respond to it.”
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variety of situations and to implicit knowledge prior to linguistic
confirmation (Bloch, 1991). Third, informal encounters in daily
life function as rich exchanges of information in which the
researcher builds a network of relations who voluntarily share
information and provide insights regarding diverse aspects of the
culture. Fourth, behaviors not directed to the participant observer
can be accessed by observing and listening others while they
interact.
In our own area of research, active participant observation
provided us insight into a category of behavior that would
be “irrelevant” by Western standards but meaningful to
Trobrianders. When Trobriand children and adolescents were
asked to match emotion labels to prototypical facial expressions
of “emotion”, the modal category was the gasping “fear” face
(Crivelli et al., 2016). In successive interviews, Trobrianders
described the gasping “fear” face using a naïve behavioral
descriptor: ekapunipuni matala (literally, his/her eyes are wide
open). By following these unexpected “rich points” (Agar, 1986),
we discovered that in the Trobriand Islands, people associate
wide-open eyes either with anger (leya) or supernatural spiritual
beings.
In fact, when adults want to instill “fear” in children, they
imitate what is said to be the visage of evil spirits with
wide-open eyes. When the sender wants others to freeze or
flee, the person displays an ekapunipuni matala face (i.e., a
gasping face). This is culturally sanctioned in a Trobriand
foundation myth (liliu) that explains the origins of ancestral
spirits. Baloma, a recently deceased woman, returns to her
village to care for her daughter’s newborn, as is customary in
the Trobriand Islands. When her daughter’s husband spots her
big wide-open eyes (matala mabulubolela) in a dark corner
of the house, he becomes frightened and spills soup on her,
offending her and leading her to invoke a curse that henceforth
human beings will not be able to see the spirits of the
dead (who take their name from the woman in the myth
and are now known as baloma; see Malinowski, 1916)5. The
baloma spirits, like other supernatural agents in Trobriand
cosmology (i.e., kosi, ghosts; itona, evil spirits; yoyowa, flying
witches), are described as having unnaturally large, wide-open
eyes.
This kind of complexity is readily explained in terms of a
behavioral-ecology view of facial displays; the receiver of the
ekapunipuni matala signal sees a supposedly “fearful” face in
the sender, but rather reacts to it as a signal of an agonistic
encounter in which one must either freeze or flee (Krebs and
Dawkins, 1984; Fridlund, 1994). We also realized that the
production of the ekapunipuni matala face has become iconic
in Trobriander’s material culture. Yoyowa—flying witches—and
other supernatural beings are represented in carvings (Figure 1)
as having big glowing eyes and jaws that are dislocated to
swallow people (Jarillo de la Torre, 2013; Aldridge and Beran,
2014).
5A version of this myth (labeled “SN 232 Baloma”) can be found in the Jerry W.
Leach Trobriand Folklore Collection, part of the Jerry W. Leach Trobriand Papers
and Sound Recordings at the National Anthropological Archives, Smithsonian
Institution.
Advantages of Speaking the Vernacular
Speaking the local language while doing research in indigenous
societies carries two advantages. First, it indicates the researcher’s
commitment to integrate with and acculturate to the locals’ view,
which builds rapport and maximizes the ability to obtain relevant
data (Newman and Ratliff, 2001). Second, it reduces the problems
inherent in translation (Naroll and Cohen, 1970).
Learning the vernacular also shows respect for the locals’
socio-cultural values (Everett, 2001). The people in local
communities are usually pleased with the humble approach of
taking the time and effort to learn their language (Duranti,
1997). As this happens, interactions become more like informal
interviews in which relevant chunks of information can be
extracted. All actors in those encounters are valuable informants
and all the interactions serve not only to validate information
previously gathered, but also to prepare the terrain for future
assessments. As researchers begin to form a network of
relationships, they can ascertain whether a given person’s
information is reliable or not (e.g., sometimes very accessible
bilingual informants tend to “embellish” facts with confabulated
stories). Moreover, the researcher can start having local intuition
about certain domains.
Using local interpreters may appear to be an appealing
alternative, but engenders several undesirable consequences.
Interpreters typically: (i) select the sample of participants or
suggest which participants to choose, (ii) influence procedures
while translating instructions out of their eagerness to assist in
the research, and (iii) tend to interpret results when translating
responses, thus inadvertently switching from direct to indirect
translations (Phillips, 1960). A factor that looms over all use
of translators is the issue of their intermediation and its
effect on the relationships between researchers and participants.
Most translators act as gatekeepers of, or brokers to, the host
community (Obstfeld et al., 2014). This de facto monopoly on
access to local information can hide local loyalties and enmities,
rewards, and stigma, and these factors can lead participants to
behave and respond in certain ways that remain unknown to the
researchers (Borchgrevink, 2003). Speaking the vernacular allows
researchers to build their own networks of relations within the
host community, and thereby become central actors themselves,
with some autonomy and independent access to information.
Field researchers should avail themselves of local
commentators or research partners. Whereas translators fulfill
a “mechanical” duty (e.g., the more or less literal translation
of a series of instructions), local collaborators can discuss, in
accordance with researchers who already know the vernacular,
the appropriateness of a task in obtaining relevant information.
Building Rapport
In most indigenous societies, many of the situations that a
Western participant would find reasonable (e.g., strangers asking
for our “feelings”) are treated with suspicion (for a similar
point, see Sorenson, 1976, p. 140). Without having established
rapport with the host community and observing how its members
naturally interact, researchers will find it very difficult to get
useful responses to topics like anger, social conventions, stigmas,
and taboos. As an example, the first co-author of this paper
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FIGURE 1 | The Ekapunipuni Matala, or the wide-eyed gasping face. (A) Walking stick (kaitukwa) from the Trobriand Islands carved to represent a flying witch
(yoyowa), with big glowing eyes and a gaping mouth to swallow people (photo: Sergio Jarillo); (B) Betel nut mortar (kaimili), Trobriand Islands (former Harry Beran
Collection, HB578 - published in Beran, 1980, p. 23, item 39. Photo: Radomir Joura).
arrived at the premature conclusion that young adults in central
Kiriwina (Trobriand Islands) were not sufficiently abstract to
engage in an interview on emotion concepts; when asked, they
either remained silent or just provided short answers. Indeed,
elders confided to him that the youngsters did not know the
myths and customs of their people, and that we should not waste
our time and gift them with betel nuts. Following the elders’
advice, the first co-author would have gathered data provided by
a very specific Trobriand subsample, underestimating diversity.
Similarly, ethnobiologists mainly rely on male elders as their
source of information, generating gender-imbalanced fieldwork
(Pfeiffer and Butz, 2005).
The second co-author of this paper, however, an
anthropologist with more than 2 years of experience in that
field site and knowledge of the customs and vernacular, knew
otherwise. As he explained, although the young adults in central
Kiriwina were warming to the psychologist’s questions on
emotions, they did not feel sufficiently confident to reveal their
thoughts on such personal issues. This was a problem of trust
and rapport for the Trobrianders, who learn to be wary about to
whom and for what purpose they disclose personal information;
such information can be used by others to benefit or harm their
reputations. In this society, individuals who spend sufficient time
in participant observation and rapport-building will receive very
valuable information on a full range of topics (e.g., for incest and
morality, see Astuti and Bloch, 2015).
As another example, the regular interaction with Trobriand
children and adolescents provided valuable insights on the
disparate uses of indigenous terms for shame and embarrassment
compared to older and educated locals (for further discussion
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on this issue, see Fernández-Dols and Crivelli, 2014). This fact
is relevant because anthropologists tend to build networks of
informants with specific sets of features that conform to the scope
of their research (e.g., they will seek out people with esoteric
knowledge if they are studying a culture’s secret rituals), but they
rarely consider children and adolescents’ reports worth the effort.
The Testing Phase: Cautionary Notes on
Designing in the Field
Much social science research has been directed toward testing
hypotheses derived from formal theories. One alternative that
reduces ethnocentrism is the development of theories grounded
in empirical data culled from socio-cultural interactions.
Anthropology offers an excellent strategy for discovering
grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). The use of
qualitative methods in the exploratory phase is followed by the
design of studies and interventions to test the relevant hypotheses
(Figure 2).
Although we agree that a general research agenda and set
of research questions should be set prior to fieldwork, the
specific hypotheses to be tested and the design of studies to test
them should follow, and depend upon, the exploratory phase
(Lopez et al., 1997). As we suggested earlier, importing to host
cultures “standard” procedures and task instructions suitable for
Western undergraduate participants is typically unproductive
(Medin and Atran, 2004). Once tests are developed that are honed
to the host culture (e.g., sorting tasks with meaningful objects
within that indigenous society), they are much easily exported
FIGURE 2 | A framework for conducting studies in indigenous
societies with a multidisciplinary research group made up of
anthropologists and psychologists. Squares denote the research path
characteristic of a Western laboratory setting; circles denote the research path
typical of fieldwork in an indigenous society.
back, mutatis mutandis, to Western society participants. In any
case, researchers can find situations in which exporting tests
and tasks to the Western society can be extremely challenging.
For example, all Trobrianders know what mwasila (magic of
attraction, radiance) means or the consequences derived from
carrying it. Trobrianders associate to mwasila the capacity to
influence the minds of those who come into contact with it,
some sort of raptured enchantment. Thus, the classic two-culture
comparison will be problematic because the concept of “mwasila”
is alien to participants from Western industrialized societies.
The need for a prior exploratory phase is provided by another
example, which we encountered in two different field sites.
The issue relates to psychological scaling. Earlier, we suggested
that, for some cultures, using self-reports would be seen as
strange or preposterous. And certainly, any scaling has to be
tested in advanced. The vernacular provides hints on counting
systems (Bender and Beller, 2008), but daily interaction confirms
what level of measurement should be used when designing
quantitative studies in the field (Bloch, 1991). We found that
data gathered via self-report with Trobrianders could use scales,
but they had to be restricted to a maximum of 4-point ordinal
unipolar scales; e.g., gala (nothing), pikekita (a little), sena (a
lot, very), and komwedona (all, everything). Likewise, Mwani
communities in Cabo Delgado Province (Mozambique) will not
go beyond the same basic ordinal scale. Thus, for these societies,
the standard practice in cross-cultural psychology of using 7- or
9-point Likert scales for self-report surveys and questionnaires
is likely to confuse many participants and produce erroneous,
unreliable data. There is no substitute for designing and scaling
in the field after acquiring familiarity with the language and
culture.
The Control Phase: Flipping What is
Normative
A potential solution to overcome the home-field disadvantage—
especially suited when psychologists and anthropologists
collaborate—is to use the indigenous society as the starting point
(Medin et al., 2010). In this approach, we “flip” the usual etic
tack and acknowledge that, as “experts” in our own Western
society’s shared meanings, it is typically easier to work out the
experimental conditions and measures in the field and bring
them home to our Western laboratories than the other way
around. We concede that it is more challenging to use the
indigenous society as our normative benchmark, but the benefits
of the exploratory phase aided by anthropological expertise yields
indispensable benefits.
Most researchers not interested in developmental studies will
gather data in Western labs by sampling from a gender-balanced
group of young adults. Accordingly, the Western sample will be
matched by a similar sample in the field. But once in the field, the
researcher is vulnerable to many unexpected difficulties in order
to match samples. For example, women could be inaccessible
(especially for male researchers); and adults engaged during
the day in subsistence activities such as fishing or gardening
could make it unfeasible to test any hypothesis that requires
daylight (e.g., sorting tasks, matching stimuli to emotion labels).
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Moreover, researchers have to consider that diversity within
a society should be expected. It is notable that, among some
indigenous societies that lack mass media, the members who
are least exposed to Western influence may be their children
and adolescents, yet studies of these populations are scarce (see
Ekman, 1972; Pica et al., 2004).
Several factors make working with children and adolescents
difficult nonetheless. First, rapport can be difficult to establish,
and younger people are unlikely to share information unless
the researcher has established trust and rapport and mastered
the vernacular. Second, attaining young cross-cultural samples
that are age-equivalent can be unrealistic because many
indigenous groups lack written records of birthdates. Moreover,
members of such groups often figure time according to
harvest seasons and lunar cycles, and they have neither
written nor oral conventions by which to demarcate finer
gradations of time. Third, particular aspects of child and
adolescent development in certain societies may make only
certain subsamples of those indigenous societies comparable
to their Western counterparts (Medin and Atran, 2004). For
example, young male Mwani adults living in Matemo Island
start sailing within the Quirimbas archipelago and the African
mainland (ndima) before age 20, whereas young female Mwani
adults rarely leave their island. For that reason, individuals
drawn from female Mwani young adults would be closer to
traditional Mwani culture due to their more limited contact with
Westerners.
PUTTING THEORY IN PRACTICE: A
TROBRIAND CASE
Our defense of a multidisciplinary approach as discussed in this
paper is not entirely new. In fact, relevant collaborations between
psychologists and anthropologists have already produced
important theoretical advances in topics that range from folk
biological taxonomies to theory of mind (Astuti, 2007; Atran
and Medin, 2008; Medin and Atran, 2008; Wassmann et al.,
2013; Beller and Bender, 2015). Moreover, some researchers
have considered as a prior step to study emotions in the
field accessing the ethnopsychological model of the target
population, focusing on the pragmatic rather than on the
referential functions of emotion language (Lutz, 1988a,b; Senft,
2009).
We agree with Astuti and Bloch (2012) when they claim that
the collaboration between psychologists and anthropologists
should not be restricted to using the anthropologist as
merely a research assistant with access to an exotic sample
in order to export and adapt Western, experimental tasks.
Likewise, we also agree with Levinson’s (2012) criticism
that it borders on psychological malpractice to gather data
from exotic samples located near tourist areas, relying on
professional translators, and using inappropriate stimuli
and procedures. Indeed, we have seen some examples of
dubious multidisciplinary collaboration of psychologists
and anthropologists in the field of emotion and facial
expression.
One of the most relevant theories of emotion of the last
50 years—Basic Emotion Theory (BET, Ekman, 1972, 2003)—
traces its foundational studies to cross-cultural comparisons
drawn between Western and Eastern industrialized societies and
the hunter-gatherer Fore of the Eastern Highlands (Papua New
Guinea). Paul Ekman and Wallace Friesen (psychologists), and
Richard Sorenson (anthropologist) went to the field in order to
test whether people from a “Stone-Age” culture, visually isolated
from the West, were able to judge the same emotion when
viewing the same facial expression as Westerners did (Ekman,
1972, 1973, 1980). It is important to note that neither of them
spoke the vernacular, nor had they spent a significant amount
of time among the Fore. Interestingly, several years after the
first expedition published in Science (Ekman et al., 1969), the
anthropologist criticized the psychologists’ approach in the field
(Sorenson, 1975, 1976). Sorenson carefully explained a series of
method artifacts that could have overestimated the sounded the
uniformitarian results reported in several high impact journals
(Ekman et al., 1969; Ekman and Friesen, 1971). Indeed, after
spending more time in the field, learning the vernacular and
the customs, Sorenson understood what failed in the past and
provided some new directions on how to test participants. Sadly,
the psychologists did not accept any of the critical points raised by
Sorenson and accused him of lying. Ekman argued that Sorenson
was “just a cinematographer, not a trained social scientist”
(Ekman, 1999, p. 310).
Unlike the previous unsuccessful “multidisciplinary” research
project, we have followed a different path. We admit that our
proposal can be discouraging for many researchers. Nowadays,
young researchers must generate numerous publications in
order to enter academia, whereas established researchers, must
maintain funding by pursuing safe, programmatic research
dictated by ongoing funding initiatives. Multidisciplinary
collaborations are long-term investments with uncertain
payoffs. Likewise, setting a field site in order to conduct
studies in small-scale, indigenous societies is not as simple
as building a permanent facility in any “isolated” village in
order to test villagers (Astuti and Bloch, 2010). To build a
truly multidisciplinary research team, the psychologist should
learn the vernacular, conduct participant observation and
build rapport with the host community aided and informally
trained by the anthropologist. Consequently, the cultural
anthropologist should also learn to integrate the strengths of
powerful descriptive methods into the generation and testing
of hypotheses relying on quantitative methods. The cultural
anthropologist and psychologist will read and discuss new topics,
new epistemological traditions, research practices, and methods.
As referred before, this process of mutual socialization into
other’s discipline is time consuming, but over the long-term the
benefits greatly exceed the costs.
The Case of Surprise
We referred earlier to our own area of emotion and facial
expression as typifying one in which theory derived on Western
presumptions was force-fit into cross-cultural investigations.
Specifically, according to Ekman’s BET, surprise was stipulated to
be a “basic emotion”: it was phylogenetic, had a restricted range
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of evolved elicitors (sudden, unexpected events), and produced a
prewired, prototypical, pan-cultural facial (i.e., brows raised and
opened mouth) and vocal (i.e., a sharp inhalation) expression
(Ekman, 2003; Sauter et al., 2010). Here, theory generalized
specific observations mainly of Westerners to an uniformitarian
claim about human emotion and behavior.
Unfortunately, later experimentation suggested that both the
observations and the generalizations about “surprise” were faulty.
In defiance of the theory, the relationship between feeling
surprised and the production of its predicted facial prototype
is very weak (Reisenzein et al., 2006, 2013), and does not
generalize to an African indigenous society (Gendron et al.,
2014a). How could this error have been avoided? Pre-theoretical
descriptions are a better starting point for developing hypotheses
than proclamatory uniformitarian theory, and they are crucial for
providing alternative hypotheses to existing theories (Fernández-
Dols, 2006; Crivelli et al., 2015).
Such descriptions also allow unexpected discoveries.
Investigators cannot know what they have not yet seen, and
should not arrive at field sites full of preconceptions that may
cloud their observations. For example, we unexpectedly found
an indigenous signal of surprise in the Trobriand Islands.
It is highly stereotyped and frequent in its production and
recognition by Trobrianders, but not Westerners. Trobrianders,
when surprised, produce neither sharp inhalations nor any
typical facial behavior. They hit their tongues against the palate,
thereby producing a fast and repeated palatal clicking sound.
Additionally, the variety of metaphoric references to the body
(e.g., lopola—her/his insides) or mind (e.g., nano-) provides
a rich conceptual system of emotion categories, challenging
the traditional notion of a one-to-one correspondence when
forcing local translators to fit into a Western (English-based)
emotion framework (Senft, 1998; Enfield and Wierzbicka,
2002).
Are there Trobriand terms for our Western “surprise”?
Eyowa lopola (literally, his or her insides have jumped) could
be translated as surprise, but its features (e.g., neutral quality
of the feeling, fast timing, closing of the eyes and wincing)
better resemble startle (Ekman et al., 1985). Other Trobriand
expressions also connote something akin to surprise, but are
different in nuance. Ekau nanogu (i.e., it has taken my mind,
it has raptured my ideas) can be said of any positive surprise
and it could be translated as “I am speechless.” This is
often conveyed through the aforementioned palatal clicking
of the tongue. Other related metaphors include ekubui lopola
(literally, his or her insides are trembling; meaning he/she is
apprehensive) and kwami lopola, (i.e., his or her belly has
been given a pleasant surprise; meaning the person is pleased).
These show how subtleties can underlie what is often reduced
to a single Western emotion term (Majid, 2012; Wierzbicka,
2014)6.
Moreover, a closer look at the features of eyowa lopola
illustrates how investigators going to the field should be wary
6Other frequently used metaphors for describing emotion categories are boluluki
lopogu (i.e., my belly is full of resentment), and kaitigamala lopola (i.e., delighted or
happy belly).
not only of one-to-one translations but also of the reliance on
information gathered solely from local translators. Trobrianders
typically describe feeling eyowa lopola when being called
unexpectedly by somebody during a walk at night. Trobrianders
will not describe feeling fear or enjoyment until they discern
whether the voice from the dark is from a person they know
or a stranger (including sorcerers or evil spirits). At first,
eyowa lopola will be used to describe how they felt when
facing an unexpected event. Although these descriptions of
feeling eyowa lopola match similar eliciting scenarios in the
canonical Western script (Ekman and Cordaro, 2011), the facial
display that accompanies eyowa lopola does not match the
script.
As we have seen, the utility of building a descriptive base
prior to testing theory-driven hypotheses should be obvious.
Exporting preconceived theory to test in the field places blinders
on the investigators and constrains the participants to react
only within the confines of the theory. Had we ventured to
the Trobriand Islands just to test a hypothesis about surprise
displays, we would have left only with a confirmation or
disconfirmation of our hypothesis, and we would have learned
nothing about how Trobrianders experience surprise, categorize
types of surprise, and react to each other when they are
surprised.
CONCLUSION
The shift toward research involving indigenous and remote
societies, particularly involving controversial areas like facial
expressions and emotion, is welcome but must proceed with care
and subtlety. We have addressed the benefits of multidisciplinary
research teams with anthropological expertise. We adhere to
the proposals made within cognitive science in the pursuit of
integrating diversity of practices, epistemologies, and peoples
for a better understanding of scientific enquiries (Bender and
Beller, 2011; Medin and Bang, 2014). In this paper we have
advocated for leveraging the strengths that anthropologists’
methods and expertise can provide when psychologists are
interested in testing hypotheses in indigenous and remote
societies. Following our past experience in the field of emotion
and facial expression, we have illustrated some recurrent
challenges that researchers may face in the field and ways to
resolve them.
For example, the omission of an exploratory phase (i.e.,
participant observation, speaking the vernacular, rapport-
building) can provide misleading results and show the
ethnocentric nature of the stimuli being used (Leys, 2010).
In the same vein, when they export Western procedures
(e.g., forced-choice response formats based on lists of
emotional terms or emotional antecedents scenarios) to
indigenous societies, without any previous descriptive
work, researchers merely implement a strategy destined
to confirm their own preconceptions, and preclude
discovery of indigenous modes of understanding. The
selection of a list of emotion terms or stories relies not
only on the vernacular, but also on the assumption that
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 9 July 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1073
fpsyg-07-01073 July 14, 2016 Time: 14:13 # 10
Crivelli et al. A Multidisciplinary Approach
there is a clear one-to-one correspondence between English
and the vernacular, as we indicated for the case of surprise
in the Trobriand Islands. Likewise, it assumes that this one-
to-one correspondence can be assessed in exclusively linguistic
terms.
The Procrustean nature of much of previous uniformitarian
research is exemplified by case of the ekapunipuni matala
face (i.e., the gasping face) case, which illustrates how
exporting and testing standard Western explanations can
preclude understanding and explaining a phenomenon within
the indigenous society’s terms. Only via the convergence of
different sorts of evidence (e.g., Trobrianders’ explanations
through conversations, interviews, material culture examples,
etc.) could an apparent conundrum regarding the “non-
recognition” of the standard “fear” display by Trobrianders have
been resolved.
Our argument centers on the idea that anthropology should
be re-instantiated within cognitive science as an equal partner
with the other foundational sub-disciplines. Although there are
multiple challenges that must be acknowledged (Beller et al.,
2012), we claim that a multidisciplinary approach should be
required to address relevant questions on cognitive science in
indigenous societies.
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